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Social capital in Central and Eastern Europe lags behind that in Western European 
countries. We analyze the determinants of individual stock of social capital– 
measured by civic participation and access to social networks – and find that this gap 
persists when we account for individual characteristics and endowments of 
respondents. However, the gap disappears completely after we include aggregate 
measures of economic development and quality of institutions. Informal institutions 
such as the prevalence of corruption in post-communist countries appear particularly 
important. With the enlargement of the European Union, the gap in social capital 
should gradually disappear as the new member states catch up (economically and 
institutionally) with the old ones.  
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Over the last decade, the interest in studying social capital has grown enormously 
among sociologists, political scientists and economists alike. While social capital is 
hardly a new concept, it has been greatly popularized by the seminal work of Robert 
Putnam (1993). In his twenty-year long research on the quality of local governments 
in Italy, Putnam identified differences in civic participation (which he proxied, most 
notably, by membership in voluntary organizations) as the source of vast disparities in 
institutional quality and, in turn, economic performance between the North and South 
of Italy. A plethora of research has followed and social capital (which, as a general 
term, encompasses Putnam’s civic participation) was found to have important real-life 
repercussions, in particular for economic, social and political development of 
societies. Macroeconomic studies (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000 and 
Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005) have found that, in cross-country perspective, 
higher density of trust and/or active membership in organizations is associated with 
higher growth. Offering an historical perspective on the issue, Greif (1994) argues 
that the cultural underpinnings of social interactions in medieval societies played a 
crucial role in reducing free riding and opportunistic behavior. These empirical 
findings cement Coleman’s (1988) assertion that social capital, just like other forms 
of capital, is productive and facilitates the attainment of goals that otherwise would 
not be possible. Accordingly, high stock of social capital increases individuals’ ability 
and willingness to cooperate, improves monitoring and enforcement of contracts, and 
reduces free-riding and information asymmetry. Social capital therefore lowers 
transaction costs, fosters innovation and dissemination of technology and thus leads to 
better economic outcomes.  
Despite the increasing recognition of the importance of social capital for economic 
outcomes, our understanding of factors that determine the stock of social capital – at 
the individual or aggregate levels – is still very limited. This is a major shortcoming, 
because “the dearth of research on determinants of social capital has held back its use 
as a policy tool in economic and social development” (Rupasingha et al., 2006: 84; 
see also Glaeser, 2001). The existing literature is concerned largely with measuring 
the stock of social capital (usually at the aggregate, national level) and its change over 
time and with investigating its impact on a particular variable of interest (typically 
economic and/or institutional development of countries). Little attention is given to 
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analyzing the factors that determine the individual stock of social capital and/or to 
explaining the sources of cross-sectional differences across countries.1  
This paper therefore constitutes one of the few attempts to bridge the gap between 
theory and empirics. Its contribution is threefold. First, we introduce a new and 
previously unavailable comparative dataset, based on multiple Eurobarometer surveys 
featuring a number of alternative measures of social capital for a sample of 28 
European countries – including the old member countries of the European Union and 
the new member countries. Second, we take the analysis of the determinants of 
individual stock of social capital to another level by considering individual and 
aggregate (country specific) factors alike. By using large multi-country data sets of 
individual respondents, our study permits the simultaneous identification of 
individual-level and societal-level determinants of social capital. Finally, by focusing 
on social capital in the enlarged EU, we aim to shed light on the existing gap in the 
stock of social capital between the developed Western countries and the former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, we investigate 
whether and why cross-sectional differences in social capital exist in Europe. In doing 
so, our analysis seeks to determine whether the East-West gap in social capital is due 
to different individual endowments such as education levels or occupational structure 
or country-specific economic and institutional characteristics.  
As the data we are using were collected for the European Commission, our 
analysis is necessarily constrained to include only the old and new member countries 
of the EU. We construct measures of social capital applicable to both groups of 
countries and analyze them in a unified framework. We then discuss our findings 
specifically in the context of the enlargement process. Though there has been some 
research on social capital in post-communist countries2 (see Paldam and Svendsen, 
2000; Adam et al., 2004), to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
                                                 
1 Furthermore, that work is largely theoretical in its nature (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Glaeser 
et al., 2002). Empirical attempts, on the other hand, are fairly recent and tend to focus primarily on 
social capital in one country (see Glaeser et al., 2002 for evidence in the United States and Groot et al., 
2007 for evidence in the Netherlands). For a recent extensive overview of social capital literature, see 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004).  
2  With the exception of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, all new member countries are former communist 
countries. This shared legacy of communism and central planning is one of their main distinguishing 
features in comparison to the old member countries of the EU. Therefore, the on-going post-communist 
transition process is an important aspect of our analysis.  
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systematically develop and jointly analyze the formation of social capital in both 
developed and transition countries.3  
In the previous literature on enlargement or, more generally, on the process of 
transition from communism to democracy and market economy, the focus has been on 
real and nominal convergence and on convergence in formal institutions (laws and 
regulations). Informal institutions such as social norms and rules of behavior have not 
received much attention. In this paper, we draw guidance from recent developments in 
the new institutional economics. That literature stresses the importance of informal 
institutions and their role in explaining differences across developed and less 
developed (both developing and transition) countries (see North, 1990; Feige, 1997). 
Given that the former communist countries are still going through transformation 
involving tremendous institutional restructuring, it is very important that informal 
institutions develop in parallel to formal institutions, so that the two remain 
compatible. If this happens, the transaction costs of such institutional restructuring, 
expressed in the form of predatory activities such as corruption and tax evasion, will 
decrease (see Pejovich, 2003). On the other hand, if formal and informal institutions 
are in conflict with each other, more of such predatory activities may be expected, as 
shown empirically by Gërxhani (2004).  
Our analysis confirms the existence of a gap in social capital between Western and 
Eastern European countries. However, rather than being a permanent legacy of 
communism, our findings suggest that this gap reflects the lower level of economic 
development and the poorer quality of institutions in the latter countries. As such, it 
should gradually disappear as the post-communist countries catch up with respect to 
both their economic development and the quality of institutions.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature 
about social capital and its measurement; section 3 introduces our data and explains 
the measures that we use; section 4 presents the conceptual framework; section 5 
provides empirical insights on the individual determinants of social capital; section 6 
completes the analysis by integrating individual and aggregate factors; finally, section 
7 provides conclusions.  
 
                                                 
3  A more recent contribution exploring only individual-level differences between Western and 
Eastern European countries, can be found in Kaasa and Parts (2007).  
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2 Social capital: definitions and measurement issues 
2.1 What is social capital? 
As a consequence of the many aspects it is thought to embody, social capital has been 
defined in a variety of ways. Although the concept itself originates from Loury (1977) 
and later Bourdieu (1986), Coleman’s (1988) definition has become especially 
popular. Coleman, presenting a sociologist’s view, defines social capital as a 
component of human capital that allows members of a given society to trust one 
another and to cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations. Putnam 
(1993: 664-665), a political scientist, offers a broader definition of social capital as 
encompassing “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests.” Stiglitz 
(2000), an economist, sees social capital – which he delineates as encompassing tacit 
knowledge, networks and reputation – as a social means to tackle moral hazard and 
incentive issues. Broadly speaking, all these definitions refer to trust, cooperative 
behavior and networks between groups as essential components of social capital 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). In the presence of trust, cooperation is easier and therefore 
the frequency and density of networks is expected to be higher.4 Interaction through 
networks in turn enhances trust and cooperative ability. According to Dasgupta 
(1988), social capital can make economic transactions more efficient by expanding 
the parties’ access to information, enabling them to coordinate activities for mutual 
benefit and reducing opportunistic behavior through repeated transactions. In 
addition, Putnam (1993) argues that participation in civic associations can contribute 
to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governments, both because of their 
internal effects on individual members and because of their external effects on the 
wider polity. “Internally, associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, 
solidarity and public-spiritedness. Externally, ‘interest articulation’ and ‘interest 
aggregation’ are enhanced by a dense network of secondary associations” (Putnam, 
1993: 89-90). All-in-all, these studies are fundamentally based on the assumption that 
                                                 
4  The direction of causality is not clearly resolved, however. Gambetta (1990), for example, argues 
that trust follows rather than causes cooperation. 
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social capital is one of the primary forces that shape social and economic 
development.5  
There is, however, theoretical (see Lipset, 1959; Flanagan, 1987; Inglehart, 1997) 
and empirical (see Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Paugam and Russell, 2000; O’Connell, 
2003; Casey and Christ, 2005) research that either questions the validity of this 
assumption or substantiates the opposite direction of causality. In other words, these 
studies argue that social capital may mediate economic development but not 
determine it, or that social capital is in fact determined by economic outcomes. 
Focusing particularly on one aspect of social capital – civic involvement in 
associations – sociologists and political scientists have found that the higher the GDP 
per capita, the higher the level of education and as a consequence wealth, and 
therefore the easier the shift toward the ‘post-materialist’ values of well-being, 
tolerance and trust – values which in turn support the development of associations 
(see Inglehart, 1990; 1997). The relationship between social capital measured as 
membership in organizations and democracy has also been researched. Discussions, 
mainly theoretical, on this relationship are also split around the issue of causality. In a 
recent empirical study, however, Paxton (2002) finds that the relationship between 
social capital and democracy is reciprocal so that they simultaneously affect each 
other.  
Obviously, whether social capital affects social, political and economic 
development or the other way around, or whether the relationship is simultaneous, 
remains a controversial issue. Because of the popularity of the concept emerging from 
the focus on the effect of social capital on societal development, in spite of some 
studies mentioned above, the reverse effect is under-researched. In order to 
understand better the development of nations, more research is needed on the 
determinants of social capital. Agreeing with social psychologists, Greif (1994) 
argues that the level of development and the organization of an economy may 
determine whether societies develop ‘collectivist’ or ‘individualist’ characteristics. 
The former tend to build up group-specific social capital – pertaining to one’s family, 
religious or ethnic group – and rely on informal enforcement, whereas the latter are 
                                                 
5  Nevertheless, it is now widely recognized that social capital may also have less desirable 
consequences. For an extensive discussion, see Portes (1998).  
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based on interactions across groups that facilitate the accumulation of generalized 
social capital and make use of formal enforcement rules.6  
An analogy can be observed between Greif’s categorization of societies and the 
two groups of countries analyzed in this paper. Most of the old member states of the 
EU are generally characterized by a high density of economic transactions among 
groups, well-established institutions, high level of generalized trust, high participation 
in civil associations and a bottom-up structure of economic transactions. 
Correspondingly, they would seem to fall into the category of individualist societies. 
New member countries, on the other hand, feature relatively large underground 
economy, greater corruption and state failure, low levels of generalized trust and 
participation in civil associations and a top-down structure of economic transactions. 
Hence, they come close to Greif’s description of collectivist societies. Moreover, with 
the exception of Cyprus and Malta as well as Turkey, which is still only a candidate 
for EU membership, the new member countries share the legacy of communism.  
Research on social capital in these countries has put forward a so-called 
dictatorship theory of missing social capital (see Raiser, 1999; Kunioka and Woller, 
1999; and Paldam and Svedsen, 2000, 2001). According to this theory, dictatorships 
destroy social capital, group-specific and generalized alike. Furthermore, they create 
conditions whereby, when dictatorships collapse, societies may even accumulate 
‘negative’ social capital, which in turn impedes economic growth. During the 
transition period in most of the new member countries, ‘positive’ social capital has 
seemingly dissipated and ‘negative’ social capital, taking the form of underground 
activities, corruption and organized crime, has become more prominent.  
The gap created by the destruction of old institutions and the introduction of new 
ones provides a favorable environment for the persistence or even further 
accumulation of ‘negative’ social capital during transition.7 The dictatorship theory of 
destroyed social capital thus adds a new dimension to Greif’s categorization. Within 
the so-called collectivist societies, there are countries which due to the legacy of 
                                                 
6  Svendsen and Svendsen (2004) use notions of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, respectively, 
to describe what we call group-specific and generalized social capital. The ‘bridging’ social capital is 
the beneficial one because it captures “open networks that are outward looking and encompass people 
across diverse social cleavages.” (p. 2)  
7  The extent to which this ‘negative’ social capital (i.e., underground activities or corruption) has 
emerged varies per country. Rose (2000) relates it to the supremacy of the totalitarian regime these 
countries experienced during communism. The same line of argument can be found in Putnam et al. 
(1993), where the low level of social capital in South Italy is attributed to the long absolutist regime of 
the Kingdom of Sicily.   
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communism may possess neither generalized nor group-specific social capital and 
may even have an inherited stock of ‘negative’ social capital.8  
These characteristics of post-communist countries provide another evidence of 
the causation running from democracy to social capital. Tong (1994: 334) observes: 
“Given the totalitarian tendencies of state socialist systems, an autonomous civil 
society rarely emerges in a bottom-up fashion, except when the regime is in serious 
crisis. Instead, its emergence is often the result of top-down efforts, that is, through 
tolerance, encouragement, or sponsorship by state policies.” 
 
2.2 Measurement of social capital  
The literature tends to attach the label social capital quite liberally to a number of 
concepts that are not necessarily equivalent to each other, causing definitional 
ambiguity (Portes, 1998). According to Durlauf (2002), the literature provides a 
mixture of ‘functional and causal conceptions of social capital’. The former refer to 
social capital as being functional in facilitating cooperation and efficiency while the 
latter refer to social capital as a social asset that causes individual cooperative 
behavior. Durlauf emphasizes the importance of causal definitions of social capital for 
successful empirical analysis.9  
The following are the most popular empirical measures of generalized social 
capital:  
 
1 Civic participation, or membership in voluntary organizations, was pioneered 
by Putnam’s (1993) seminal work on Italian regions. Through membership in 
voluntary organizations, one learns to interact with other people – both 
acquaintances and strangers – in a cooperative manner and to solicit their 
cooperation to achieve a shared objective.10 As such, voluntary organizations 
introduce their members to advantages and practice of collective action (Olson, 
1982). Later work distinguishes further between Putnamesque and Olsonian 
                                                 
8  Leitzel (1997), however, provides an interesting insight on this issue by highlighting some positive 
effects of ‘negative’ social capital. He argues that collective breaking of ‘bad’ rules such as excessive 
regulation of the emerging private sector may in fact have positive consequences as it eventually forces 
the authorities to abandon such bad rules and replace them with better ones.  
9  For a broader review of empirical analysis of social capital, see Durlauf (2002).  
10  For instance, participating in team sports or playing an instrument in an orchestra requires an 
extraordinary degree of cooperation, coordination and discipline. The fans of The Simpsons television 
series may recall Lisa Simpson’s unsuccessful attempt at individualism when playing the saxophone in 
a school orchestra, which illustrates this point rather well.  
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organizations (Knack and Keefer, 1997). The former, such as educational, 
sport and art clubs, religious and charitable organizations and youth groups, 
allow their members to build up social capital and to pursue common goals 
without imposing negative externalities on the rest of the society. The latter, 
including political parties and movements, trade unions, professional 
associations, and various interest groups, tend to engage in collective action 
that reconfigures redistribution systems in their favor at the expense of the rest 
of the society. Therefore, in contrast to Putnamesque groups, which are 
thought to play a positive role in the society, the impact of Olsonian groups 
may be negative.  
2 Trust, popularized by Fukuyama (1995), has become the most commonly used 
empirical measure of social capital. Its empirical popularity is largely due to 
the availability of extensive cross-country survey data on generalized trust 
(such as those collected within the framework of the World Value Surveys 
program). Typically, trust is defined as the extent to which people find 
strangers trustworthy.  
3 Density of networks is a measure of ties between individuals. Network-based 
ties can be formal or informal. In formal networks, ties between individuals 
take the form of joint presence at a formal event or membership in an 
organization. Alumni associations are an example of formal networks which 
may partially overlap with membership in voluntary organizations. Informal 
networks, on the other hand, consist of relations among friends, members of 
(extended) family, colleagues and the like. As argued in Paxton (1999), while 
informal networks are primarily based on ties between individuals, formal 
networks go beyond that by accessing and creating additional group-level 
benefits.  
4 Philanthropic generosity (i.e., altruism). This measure is based on Putnam’s 
(2001) finding that the frequency of charitable contributions in the US over 
time has been highly correlated with membership in voluntary organizations. 
This measure is problematic, however, because individual-level altruism may 
depend on the generosity of the welfare state. In a society with a high degree of 
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redistribution, one may therefore observe less philanthropic generosity, 
without this necessarily implying a lower level of social capital.11  
 
Following up on Durlauf’s (2002) emphasis on the importance of causal definitions of 
social capital, we define social capital as an asset that facilitates individual cooperative 
behavior. More specifically, we employ Bourdieu’s definition of social capital: “the 
aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). The relevance of this definition lies, first, in its 
focus on the social relationship itself and, second, in the emphasis related to the 
benefits associated with participation in such a relationship. As summarized by Portes 
(1998: 6), it is exactly “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership 
in social networks or other social structures” that this paper looks at.  
The following section provides a description of the data and methodology used, 
and explains how social capital is operationalized in this paper.  
 
3 Social capital in Europe 
Our measures of social capital are constructed using several recent Eurobarometer 
surveys commissioned by the European Commission and carried out by Gallup 
Europe.12 As our analysis pertains to the period before the latest EU enlargements, we 
use both the standard Eurobarometer surveys (henceforth EB) carried out in the 15 
countries that were members of the European Union at the time13 and the so-called 
Candidate Countries Eurobarometers (henceforth CCEB) that were introduced to offer 
similar data on the new member countries14 since 2000. The two types of surveys 
were implemented using essentially the same methodology and frequently contained 
similar or identical questions.15 Importantly, the EB surveys featured questions that 
                                                 
11  We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this drawback of this measure.  
12  We are grateful to Robert Manchin of The Gallup Organisation Europe for kindly making these 
data available to us. 
13  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
14  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. All of these countries, except Turkey, have since become members of 
the EU. 
15  The surveys in question are EB 50.1 (1998), 52.1 (1999) and 56.1 (2001) as well as CCEB 2002.1. 
The surveys are carried out by means of face-to-face interviews, with approximately 1,000 respondents 
per country, except for Germany (1,000 respondents in each West and East Germany), United 
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address various aspects of social capital and identical questions were included in the 
April 2002 CCEB survey. We can therefore carry out comparative analysis with both 
sets of countries. The EB/CCEB questions of interest gauge three aspects of social 
capital: civic participation, access to social networks and altruism (philanthropic 
generosity). These three components capture both quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of social capital, since the first and, to some extent, the second aspect 
indicate objective associations or ties between individuals, while the last together with 
parts of the second reflect the subjectivity within a tie.16 Table 1 presents the 
aggregate figures.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The first measure in Table 1 is the average civic participation, quantified as active 
membership in voluntary organizations. Specifically, the respondents were asked: 
“From the following list, could you tell me in which of these organizations do you 
actively participate?”. The list of organizations included: charities (social, communal 
or religious); religious or parish organizations other than charities; cultural or artistic 
organizations; trade unions or political parties; human rights movements or 
organizations; organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the 
environment; youth organizations such as scouts or youth clubs; consumer 
organizations; sports clubs and associations; hobby clubs; and other clubs or 
organizations. It should be stressed that the question asks the respondents to list those 
organizations in which they actively participate. We believe that active participation is 
crucial for the link between membership in voluntary organizations and social capital: 
one builds up social capital through interacting with fellow members and participating 
in common activities, not by paying membership dues or holding a membership 
card.17 Unfortunately, the question only records each type of organization, thereby 
                                                                                                                                            
Kingdom (additional 300 respondents in Northern Ireland), Poland and Turkey (2,000 respondents 
each), and Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta (500 respondents each). The overall sample size thus is 
approximately 16,000 for the EB surveys and 14,000 for the CCEB. The same questionnaire is used in 
all countries of the respective group (EB or CCEB), the questionnaire is translated and interviewers are 
local staff. The surveys are constructed so as to be broadly representative at the national level. The data 
report East Germany and Northern Ireland as separate entities, and we maintain this distinction. See 
WZB (2003) for more details. 
16  For a detailed discussion, see Paxton (1999). 
17  An implication of this formulation is that being a member of a religion and attending religious 
services is not regarded as social capital, unless one actively participates in religious or parish 
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disregarding multiple memberships in similar organizations (e.g., one may be a 
member of two or more sports clubs). As the survey asked about membership in 11 
types of organizations (including an ‘other’ category), the maximum value that this 
variable can attain is 11. To be consistent with the literature (see section 2.2), we split 
the membership count into Putnamesque and Olsonian groups in the next two 
columns. No question on trust was included in the Eurobarometer surveys. For 
comparative purposes, the last two columns of the first part of Table 1 report country 
averages of level of generalized trust as measured by World Value Surveys rounds of 
1990 and 1996. Specifically, the figures measure the fraction of respondents who 
declared that most people could be trusted when asked: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing 
with people?”. Though this is not a measure used in this paper,18 the correlation 
analysis reported below suggests that civic participation and generalized trust are 
highly correlated, at least in the sample of countries covered by our analysis.  
The first three columns of the second part of Table 1 measure the presence of 
social networks that one can rely on if in need. Specifically, respondents were asked: 
“If you had any of the following problems (you were feeling depressed; you needed 
help finding a job for yourself or a member of your family; or you needed to borrow 
money to pay an urgent bill, like electricity, gas, rent or mortgage) is there anyone 
you could rely on to help you, from outside your own household?”. As each of these 
three networks is different in nature, we codify them as separate binary variables 
equal to one if the individual has access to the network in question and zero 
otherwise.  
The last two columns of the second part of the table report on the respondents’ 
altruistic behavior, based on the following two questions: “Now thinking about poor 
                                                                                                                                            
organizations. Applying a more liberal concept would result in artificially high levels of social capital 
for countries with high identification with a dominant religion (e.g., the Roman-Catholic church in 
Poland or Italy). 
18  Some argue that generalized trust is not an adequate measure of social capital, because it does not 
differentiate between trust and trustworthiness (see Bornhorst et al., 2004), and because it is context-
dependent. For example, in an ethnically polarized society, a member of the minority group –even if 
perfectly trustworthy– will often neither be trusted by the majority of population nor him(her)self trust 
the members of the majority (see Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001). In addition, the same individual would 
report considerably different generalized trust depending on the wording (or understanding) of the 
question: he or she would report high trust vis-à-vis members of own group but low trust vis-à-vis 
members of the majority group. Glaeser et al. (2000) provide a fine combination of experimental and 
field data to measure both concepts of trust and trustworthiness. For an interesting theoretical study of 
trustworthiness, as corresponding to a non-incentive based type of social capital, see Francois and 
Zabojnik (2005). 
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or socially excluded people, in the last twelve months, have you done the following 
(given money or goods to poor or socially excluded people; given up some of your 
time to help poor or socially excluded people) at least once a month, less often or 
have you not done it?”. The answers are coded as 0 for those who have never 
contributed money or given up their time, 1 for those who have done so less than once 
a month and 2 for those who have done so more often.  
For each measure of social capital, countries are presented in descending order. 
The average figures for the old EU members and the new member countries are also 
included. There are clear similarities in the ordering of countries across the different 
measures. Whether the various indicators measure the same underlying phenomenon 
(i.e., social capital) or not can be assessed by means of correlation analysis. Table 2 
presents the correlation matrix for the various measures at the aggregate level. 
Clearly, civic participation is very closely correlated with aggregate generalized trust: 
the correlation coefficients between trust and average participation as well as 
membership in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups are all close to 0.8. The correlation 
analysis further suggests that Putnamesque and Olsonian groups are not necessarily 
that different from each other: countries with high participation in one category of 
groups also display high levels of participation in the other. Similarly, both types are 
closely correlated with generalized trust. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, 
we maintain the distinction between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups in the 
remainder of our analysis.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Countries which display high levels of civic participation tend to have also more 
extensive social networks, as suggested by the correlation coefficients between 
average participation and networks, at around 0.5. Correlation between networks and 
generalized trust is similarly high, between 0.3 and 0.6 for the 1996 WVS round. The 
only indicator that stands out as largely orthogonal to either civic participation or 
generalized trust is altruism. In contrast to Putnam’s (2001) assertion, our data suggest 
that both measures of philanthropic generosity are at best weakly correlated with the 
remaining variables.  
Finally, based on Table 1, two observations can be made about the distribution of 
social capital across countries. First, with the exception of giving up one’s time to 
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help the poor, all indicators listed in Table 1, show the old member countries as 
having on average higher stock of social capital than the new member countries. 
Given that the vast majority of the new EU members are post-communist countries, 
this observation seems to confirm the assertion of Paldam and Svendsen (2000, 2001) 
and Adam et al. (2004) that communism destroyed social capital by discouraging 
social interactions outside one’s immediate network of friends and family. Second, 
there is nonetheless a considerable degree of variation within both groups of countries 
– some new member countries display high endowments of social capital whereas 
some old member countries fare rather poorly. A detailed analysis shedding light on 
these differences is provided in the following sections. 
 
4 Conceptual framework  
As suggested by Bourdieu (1986), we view social capital as a productive asset that is 
built up through investment in social relationships: it takes time, effort and often 
financial outlays to accumulate. Once built up, as with other types of capital (physical 
and human), social capital generates a return, depreciates over time and needs to be 
kept up to prevent it from dissipating and becoming obsolete. An individual’s 
investment in social capital therefore should depend on the individual’s socio-
economic characteristics, in particular age, family background, level of human capital 
(education and occupation) and income (see Coleman, 1988). While our approach in 
this paper is purely empirical, this notion of social capital can be supported by 
standard economic theory, as is done by Glaeser et al. (2002) who model individual 
stock of social capital as the outcome of an individual maximization problem with 
limited resources. Furthermore, in line with our discussion in section 2, we also 
consider aggregate determinants of social capital such as the level of economic 
development and quality of institutions. The former – e.g. the level and distribution of 
income – may help create more cohesive societies and hence encourage the formation 
of social capital (Inglehart, 1990; Wilkinson, 1996). The latter – e.g. the rule of law, 
institutional transparency and stability and continuity of democracy – are likely to 
affect the return to investment in any type of capital, including the social one. In more 
transparent and less corrupt societies, individuals are more willing to engage in civic 
activities (O’Connell, 2003). According to Paldam (2002), corruption is by far the 
best available measure of ‘negative’ social capital. Democracy is also an important 
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factor influencing not only civic engagement but also voluntary membership in 
associations (Curtis et al., 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). In other 
words, individuals in countries with less transparent and less democratic institutions 
may be discouraged from investing and, in turn, will acquire less generalized social 
capital than their counterparts in countries with better institutional environment.  
In this paper, we are interested in identifying the determinants of the stock of 
social capital. Formally, denoting social capital as yi*, we would like to estimate the 
following model:  
  yi* = xiβ + zi∂ + εi       (1) 
where xi is a vector of individual socio-economic characteristics, zi is a vector of 
aggregate country-level determinants and εi is an unobserved error term.  
However, we do not observe social capital directly. Instead, we observe 
individual membership in voluntary organizations and social networks, which we 
believe to be manifestations of an individual’s stock of social capital. As very few 
individuals participate in more than three organizations, we recoded civic 
participation so that it takes values 0, 1, 2, or 3, with 3 denoting anyone who 
participates in three or more organizations. The participation in Putnamesque and 
Olsonian groups was recoded in the same way. Social networks remain defined as 
above: zero-one dummy variables indicates access to the respective network. The 
estimations are therefore performed by ordered and binomial logitic regressions (or 
so-called ordered and binomial logit) for civic participation and social networks, 
respectively. The ordered logit model assumes the following correspondence between 
social capital and civic participation, denoting the latter as y: 
  y = 0  if y*≤0 
  y = 1  if 0<y*≤µ1 
  y = 2  if µ1<y*≤µ2 
  y = 3  if µ2<y*. 
where µ1, µ2 and µ3 are unknown parameters corresponding to threshold levels of 
social capital at which individuals increase their civic participation. Assuming the 
error term has a logistic distribution, the ordered logit model estimates the 
probabilities of an observation falling within each category as a function of the 
individual and aggregate characteristics, xi and zi respectively.19 An important 
                                                 
19 See Greene (1997), section 19.8.  
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advantage of the ordered logit model is that, unlike linear regression, it does not 
stipulate that, for example, an individual participating in two voluntary organizations 
has twice as large stock of social capital as an individual participating in only one 
organization. The binomial logit, which we use for our analysis of social networks, is 
a special case of the above with y taking values 0 and 1 only and with only one 
threshold parameter, µ1. For both models, obtaining a positive coefficient estimate 
implies that the variable in question increases the probability of having a higher stock 
of social capital.  
 
Endogeneity issues  
A valid empirical concern is that income – and possibly other right-hand side 
variables – may be endogenous in social capital. As income is contemporaneous with 
social capital, unlike education which is typically acquired at a relatively young age, 
positive correlation may reflect the fact that social capital helps individuals achieve 
higher earnings. The appropriate approach in this case would be to use suitable 
instruments for income. We would require individual characteristics that can explain 
income without being correlated with social capital directly. Finding good instruments 
is notoriously hard, however, especially when, as in our case, the number of variables 
to choose from is limited and the data pools four different surveys which did not 
always include the same questions. Alternatively, we could identify the relationship 
between social capital and income if we could identify exogenous variation in income 
that cannot be attributed to changes in social capital. This approach would be virtually 
impossible in a single cross-section and would instead require a panel-data analysis. 
In addition, the objective of our paper is to explain the gap in social capital between 
new and old member countries of the EU – and, more generally, between less 
developed and developed countries – rather than to resolve the question of 
endogeneity of social capital with respect to income. The endogeneity bias, if present, 
would tend to inflate our coefficients for the impact of income on social capital and 
therefore the coefficients that we obtain present the upper bound of this effect.  
Because of our concerns about possible endogeneity of income in social capital, 
we re-estimated all of our regressions while omitting the income variable. 
Importantly, the coefficients estimated for the other variables remain essentially the 
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same regardless of whether income is included or not.20 Hence, even if the coefficient 
for income is biased upwards, this should not affect our conclusions on the sources of 
the East-West gap in social capital.  
An implication of the potential endogeneity of income (and perhaps of some of 
the other variables) is that our regression results cannot be interpreted as necessarily 
identifying causality. Rather, they are indicative of conditional correlation only and 
any associated discussion of causal relations is to a large extent speculative.  
Another type of endogeneity is likely in aggregate-level studies: social capital 
may determine economic outcomes such as economic growth or the level of economic 
development (see Durlauf, 2002). Importantly, this does not apply to our analysis 
because we work with individual stocks of social capital. While economic outcomes 
are likely to be endogenous in aggregate (country-level) social capital, each individual 
respondent is too small for her social capital to have an impact on the aggregate 
economic outcomes. 
  
5 Individual determinants of social capital 
As a first step, we relate the individual stock of social capital to only individual socio-
demographic characteristics: gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, 
residency in urban vs. rural areas and income. Formally, this implies estimating a 
reduced form of equation (1): 
yi* = xiβ + εi        (1’) 
This allows us to ascertain whether the gap in social capital levels between old and 
new member countries is due to differences in socio-economic and demographic 
individual-level characteristics (or endowments). For instance, new and old member 
countries could have different average stocks of social capital because their 
populations have different distributions of age, education or occupations. However, 
the descriptive statistics summarized in Table 3 suggest that this is unlikely to be the 
case. Except for having somewhat higher shares of unemployment and retired 
workers, the new member states are remarkably similar to the old ones. Furthermore, 
the country that stands out the most is Turkey, which has a younger population, larger 
households a higher share of the population being unemployed, out of labor force or 
                                                 
20 The results obtained without income can be provided upon request.  
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in farming, fewer retirees and fewer people with post-primary education than either 
the new or old member states. While Turkey is included in the summary statistics in 
Tables 1-3, we do not include it in our empirical analysis below.21  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Based on previous research, we should expect social capital to be higher among 
older people (Putnam, 1995) or to follow a life-cycle pattern (Glaeser et al., 2000); 
married individuals to have a slightly higher stock of social capital (Putnam, 1995); 
education to be positively correlated with social capital (Helliwell and Putnam, 1999; 
Glaeser et al., 2002); entrepreneurship (self-employment) to contribute to a higher 
stock of social capital (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004); residency in urban areas to 
decrease social capital; and income to be positively correlated with investment in 
social capital (Rupasingha et al., 2006). To account for country-specific factors, we 
also include country dummies. However, East Germany and Northern Ireland are 
reported as separate entities in the EB data sets and we maintain this distinction 
because of the potentially special nature of these two regions.  
The dependent variables are two of the measures introduced in section 3: civic 
participation and social networks.22 Table 4 reports the regression results obtained 
with civic participation for the new member countries, while Table 5 presents those 
for the old member states. Because of the potentially important difference between 
Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, we analyze determinants of civic participation 
using overall participation first and then also separating it into these two types of 
voluntary organizations. Table 6 reports the results of regressions with social 
                                                 
21  This is done for two reasons. First, due to its unclear status with respect to membership in the EU. 
Second, because it differs from the other new member countries in many important aspects such as the 
level of development and cultural and religious traditions. Nonetheless, including Turkey in the 
regressions or omitting also Cyprus and Malta (which do not share the post-communist legacy 
characteristic of the other new member countries) produce qualitatively very similar results which are 
therefore not reported here but can be obtained upon request.  
22  Despite the low correlation of altruism with either civic participation or social networks, using the 
two measures of helping the poor and socially excluded yields results broadly similar to those obtained 
with civic participation and social networks. This, in addition to the previously discussed issue of 
altruism as a problematic measure are the main reasons why the results related to altruism are not 
reported here. They can however be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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networks for the new member states while Table 7 shows the results for the old 
member states of the European Union.23  
 
TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE 
TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE 
 
Looking first at the overall civic participation, a number of individual 
characteristics appear to shape individual investment in social capital. Our results 
generally confirm the findings of previous research. Older individuals display higher 
civic participation until approximately 50-60 years of age,24 whereupon their social 
capital starts to decline. Access to social networks, on the other hand, declines 
continuously with age. Educated individuals and white-collar workers possess higher 
stock of social capital, whereas unemployed, inactive individuals and females have 
lower stocks. Higher income seems to translate into higher stock of social capital. 
Finally, urban residents participate in fewer organizations and have poorer access to 
social networks than rural residents.  
Somewhat surprisingly, only a few differences emerge when comparing 
participation in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups. Education and income are 
positively correlated with active participation in both types of groups. The age profile 
of social capital over one’s lifetime is more pronounced and steeper for Olsonian 
groups – participation in collective action aimed at distributive objectives increases 
and subsequently falls more dramatically with age than participation in Putnamesque 
groups. The unemployed, retirees, house-persons and females, on the other hand, tend 
to stay away from Olsonian groups but do participate in Putnamesque ones – they 
pursue their interests and hobbies but not distributional objectives. Married people are 
less likely to participate in Putnamesque groups but more likely to get organized in 
                                                 
23  Note that the pseudo r-squared that we report alongside our regression results is the McFadden’s r-
squared. Limited-dependent variable models such as binomial and ordered logit are non-linear and 
therefore do not have an equivalent of the r-squared statistic computed for OLS models and their 
interpretation is somewhat different. While this measure is bound to lie within the [0, 1] interval and 
increases with the quality of the model, it is typically lower than the r-squared estimated for a 
comparable linear regression model. 
24 Specifically, our regression result effectively implies that social capital is a quadratic function of age 
and this age range is where this function reaches its peak. Although a different peak point is obtained 
for each regression, they all fall within the 50-60 years range.  
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Olsonian ones. The self-employed and white-collar workers, finally, tend to 
participate more often in Putnamesque rather than in Olsonian groups.25  
The positive relationship between education and the stock of social capital 
suggests complementarity between social and human capital: individuals who acquire 
a high stock of one also invest in the other (Coleman, 1988, also makes this point).26 
In addition, education may reduce the cost of investing in social capital by improving 
one’s communication skills, increasing social interaction and networking or by 
generating positive externalities (Helliwell and Putnam, 1999; Rupasingha et al., 
2006). The positive effect of income confirms the existing empirical findings but 
contradicts the theoretical predictions that investment in social capital should fall with 
opportunity cost of time embodied in earnings (Glaeser et al., 2002). A possible 
explanation for this finding is that obtaining social capital requires both time and 
monetary outlays.  
Finally, the individual determinants of social capital appear similar in old and 
new member countries of the EU. Given that, as demonstrated in Table 3, old and new 
member countries have generally comparable socio-economic structure and that the 
impact of the various individual characteristics on social capital seems similar, we 
expect country-specific factors to play an important role in accounting for the East-
West gap. This is already insinuated by the high and significant country dummies in 
tables 4-7. In the next section, we therefore consider aggregate determinants of social 
capital.  
 
6 Economic development and institutional quality 
In this section, we extend the analysis of determinants of social capital by 
considering, alongside individual characteristics, aggregate factors such as economic 
development and the quality of institutions. We thus estimate the full version of 
equation (1), with the aggregate variables captured by vector zi. In doing so, we hope 
to gain additional insights into the factors that underlie the formation of social capital 
                                                 
25  This finding confirms the argument provided by Svendsen and Svendsen (2004: 3), that 
“entrepreneurship […] facilitates voluntary collective action and the creation of inclusive types of 
social capital”. 
26  However, this result could also be caused by endogeneity of education in social capital, whereby 
individuals with high stock of the latter acquire more education, and therefore should be interpreted 
with a grain of salt.  
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at the individual level and explain the gap in the level of social capital between old 
and new EU member countries.  
As we want to determine whether old and new member countries of the EU have 
significantly different social capital levels, we merge the two groups of countries of 
the EU and include a dummy variable for the new members – while dropping the 
country dummies. Obtaining a significant coefficient on the ‘new members’ dummy 
would indicate that there is indeed a gap between the old and the new members that 
cannot be explained by the variables included in the regression. 
At first, we run the regressions only with individual characteristics, thereby 
merely replicating the above-reported results using the merged data set. These results 
are reported in Table 8, again for civic participation – overall active participation in 
voluntary organization as well as participation in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups 
separately – and for access to social networks. The impact of individual 
characteristics mirrors our previous findings: age, education, income, occupation and 
employment status are all important determinants of the individual stock of social 
capital. Note, however, that in this merged data set the self-employed now display 
significantly lower civic participation whereas before the self-employed dummy 
appeared with positive coefficient for the new member countries and an insignificant 
or marginally significant negative coefficient for the old member countries. 
The results of the first regression, with overall civic participation, confirm the 
observation based on country averages as reported in Table 1 that the new members 
lag significantly behind the old member countries in their stock of social capital: the 
coefficient on the new members dummy is negative and strongly significant. When 
distinguishing between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, an interesting result 
appears: the new member countries do better than old member countries with respect 
to participation in Putnamesque groups but do worse for Olsonian groups. The 
coefficient estimate, however, is much lower – in absolute value – for the former than 
for the latter. Hence, when the two types of groups are pooled together in ‘overall 
civic participation’, the lower participation in Olsonian groups more than offsets the 
effect of higher participation in Putnamesque ones and the new member countries thus 
appear to lag behind the old member countries. This result is particularly interesting 
because it cannot be readily discerned from the country averages in Table 1. In that 
table, new member countries appear with lower participation in both Olsonian and 
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Putnamesque groups; it is only after accounting for individual characteristics that this 
striking difference becomes apparent.  
As we will see later when accounting for institutional factors, the finding that the 
new member countries lag behind especially with respect to participation in Olsonian 
groups reflects a general dissatisfaction with, and lack of trust in, formal institutions 
in the new member countries. This dissatisfaction is particularly strong with respect to 
groups such as political parties and unions. This has its roots in communism – 
common to all new member countries except Cyprus and Malta – when political 
activity was not voluntary, trade unions were highly politicized and subordinated to 
the communist party and civil society emerged in a bottom-up fashion (Tong, 1994).  
The gap in social capital also appears when considering access to social networks: 
across all three sub-measures, the new members appear to lag significantly behind the 
old member countries of the EU.  
 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 
To assess the impact of country-level economic and institutional environment, we 
augmented the regressions with a number of aggregate indicators of economic 
development and institutional quality: GDP per capita measured in purchasing-power-
parity terms, the Gini coefficient of income inequality, the Transparency 
International’s corruption-perception index inverted so that higher values indicate 
lower corruption, the average of indexes of political freedom and civil liberties 
reported by the Freedom House (in alternative regression specifications, we replaced 
this democracy index with a measure of the fraction of years since 1972 that the 
country was classified by the Freedom House as free or partially free), economic 
freedom index compiled by the Frasier Institute, and the average economic growth 
over the preceding three years. Though we tried several alternative regression 
specifications,27 the results are broadly similar and therefore we report, in Table 9, 
only the most general specification, which relate individual stock of social capital to 
the level of economic development proxied by per-capita GDP, income inequality, 
                                                 
27  Additional results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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pervasiveness of corruption and economic freedom, alongside the same individual 
characteristics as before.28  
 
TABLE 9 HERE 
 
The results are striking: once the economic development and institutional quality 
are controlled for, the new member countries no longer seem to be different from the 
old members with respect to their stock of social capital. Recall that in the regressions 
reported in Table 8, the new-member dummy appeared always with a negative and 
significant coefficient with the exception of participation in Putnamesque groups. 
Once we control for country-specific characteristics, however, the dummy appears 
with a positive and significant coefficient in the first three regressions, indicating that 
the new members display significantly higher active participation in voluntary 
organizations, Putnamesque and Olsonian alike, than old members. In the regressions 
on access to social networks, the dummy is estimated with a negative but insignificant 
coefficient. These results suggest that new member countries have social capital levels 
that are no lower than what one should expect given their level of economic 
development and institutional quality. For civic participation, their social capital may 
be even higher than what the model would predict. In fact, already when controlling 
only for GDP per capita, the new-members dummy appears with a significantly 
positive coefficient in the regression with Putnamesque groups and is not significant 
in the remaining regressions, thereby suggesting that the East-West gap can perhaps 
be attributed largely to the different levels of economic development attained by old 
and new member countries.  
The impact of country-specific economic and institutional conditions is in line 
with previous research. Higher per-capita income levels tend to be associated with 
more frequent civic participation. The relationship is, however, not very robust and 
when additional aggregate indicators are included in the regression it often appears 
insignificant (as it is the case in the regressions reported in Table 9). Interestingly 
enough, individuals in richer countries have poorer access to social networks when in 
need of money, possibly because of the presence of more advanced financial systems 
in those countries (individual in richer countries are likely to have an easier time to 
                                                 
28  Note that we adjusted the standard errors for the fact that aggregate and individual variables are 
measured at different levels of aggregation.  
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obtain a bank loan and therefore would have less need to rely on their acquaintances 
in case of hardship). Individuals in countries with high income inequality and 
especially in those with rampant corruption tend to acquire less social capital. 
Economic freedom seems to encourage investment in social capital.  
These patterns are very intuitive. Income inequality reflects the intensity of social 
conflict and polarization in a country (see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Rodrik, 1999; 
Rupasingha et al., 2006). Conflict-stricken and socially polarized countries, not 
surprisingly, end up with lower accumulation of generalized social capital (and 
probably other types of capital as well). Rampant corruption and extensive regulation 
of the economy (the inverse of economic freedom) reduce the returns on any kind of 
investment, whether it is in social capital or in other productive capacities. Therefore, 
both formal and informal institutions (economic freedom belonging to the former, 
while corruption being an expression of the latter) matter for individual acquisition of 
generalized social capital.  
Finally, it is reassuring to note that the individual socio-demographic attributes 
(education, occupation, unemployment and income) remain strongly significant after 
controlling for aggregate determinants of social capital. While we cannot exclude the 
possibility of reverse causality (social capital driving outcomes in terms of education 
or occupation), our results constitute suggestive evidence that both individual and 
aggregate factors play important roles in underlying individual decisions on acquiring 
social capital.  
 
7 Conclusion 
Using recent Eurobarometer surveys, this paper presents new and previously 
unavailable comparative data featuring a number of alternative measures of social 
capital for a sample of 28 European countries, including the old member countries of 
the European Union, the countries that since 2004 have joined the EU as new 
members (mainly Central and Eastern European countries) and Turkey. Focusing on 
civic participation and access to social networks as two key (quantitative and 
qualitative) measures of social capital, we analyze the determinants of individual 
stock of social capital, considering individual (socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics) and aggregate (economic development and quality of institutions) 
factors alike. Previous literature – Paldam and Svendsen (2000) and Adam et al. 
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(2004) – identified a gap in the average stock of social capital between the developed 
Western countries and the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
That literature attributes the presence of this gap to the legacy of communism. Our 
findings confirm this gap both when looking at the raw data and in regression analysis 
when considering only individual determinants of social capital. We find, however, 
that the gap between East and West disappears completely once we account for some 
basic aspects of economic development and quality of institutions in the individual 
countries. Hence, the fact that the new member states display lower levels of social 
capital can be attributed to their lower level of economic development and poorer 
institutions, especially more pervasive corruption, rather than potentially long-lasting 
historical legacy of communism.29  
Although convergence in formal institutions between the old and the new member 
states has to a large extent been accomplished (largely as a prerequisite of their 
accession to the EU), there remains a mismatch between these ‘harmonized’ formal 
institutions and the existing informal institutions in the new member countries (see 
Pejovich, 2003, for a broader discussion). This lack of correspondence, embodied in 
the prevalence of corruption and other predatory activities, may be the underlying 
reason for the gap in social capital. This argument can be reinforced by our finding 
that the participation in Olsonian groups (formal political groups and parties or 
unions) is much lower than in Putnamesque groups in the new member countries, 
reflecting the individuals’ lack of trust in formal institutions. In this respect, we agree 
with previous research that argues that social capital (as measured by voluntary 
participation in organizations) is not merely dependent on individuals’ wealth, 
education or particular interests but also on the cultural and institutional arrangements 
defined at the national level (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001).  
The enlargement of the European Union is expected to foster institutional 
development and encourage adoption of growth-enhancing economic policies in the 
new member countries. This will, in turn, discourage rent-seeking, motivate a 
rewarding scheme of leadership based on performance, enhance public trust in the 
state’s actions and promote civic spirit. All this should reduce the return to ‘negative’ 
                                                 
29 Note that, as we argue in section 4, aggregate-level economic development (measured by GDP per 
capita) cannot be endogenous in individual-level social capital because each individual’s effect on 
aggregate outcomes is infinitesimally small. Had we regressed aggregate social capital on economic 
development, similar conclusion would stand on much shakier foundations. The conclusion, however, 
is open to possible criticism that both social capital and economic development are driven by some 
third factor which we failed to identify by our analysis.  
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social capital and encourage the formation of ‘positive’ social capital. Thus, once 
Central and Eastern European countries catch up with the West in terms of economic 
development and institutions, they are very likely to close the gap in social capital as 
well. For this to be possible, however, a gradual harmonization of formal rules and 
informal norms between the two groups of countries should be of primary importance.  
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Table 1: Alternative measures of social capital 
Average Participation Olson Groups Putnam Groups Trust WVS90 WVS96 
Sweden 2.00 Sweden 1.00 Netherlands 1.08 Sweden 66.10 56.59 
Denmark 1.78 Denmark 0.79 Sweden 1.00 Finland 62.72 47.92 
Netherlands 1.70 Netherlands 0.62 Denmark 0.99 Denmark 57.66  
Finland 1.24 Finland 0.44 N. Ireland 0.81 Netherlands 53.47  
Luxembourg 1.03 Luxembourg 0.34 Finland 0.80 Ireland 47.37  
Czech Rep. 0.94 EU-OM  0.28 Ireland 0.74 Great Britain 43.68 29.09 
Germany West 0.93 Austria 0.25 Germany West 0.73 N. Ireland 43.62  
EU-OM  0.91 Great Britain 0.22 Czech Rep. 0.73 EU-OM  41.16 37.74 
N. Ireland 0.90 Czech Rep. 0.21 Luxembourg 0.69 Germany West 37.86 39.92 
Great Britain 0.88 Slovakia 0.20 Great Britain 0.67 Italy 35.30  
Austria 0.88 Cyprus 0.20 Slovakia 0.66 Poland 34.51 16.91 
Slovakia 0.86 Germany West 0.19 EU-OM  0.64 Spain 34.24 28.65 
Ireland 0.84 Belgium 0.17 Austria 0.63 Belgium 33.50  
Belgium 0.73 Turkey 0.15 Malta 0.57 Austria 31.82  
Cyprus 0.72 Slovenia 0.14 Slovenia 0.56 Lithuania 30.80 21.31 
Slovenia 0.70 Malta 0.13 Belgium 0.56 Bulgaria 30.40 23.69 
Malta 0.69 EU-NM  0.12 Cyprus 0.53 Czech Rep. 30.25  
France 0.58 Germany East 0.12 Estonia 0.48 Estonia 27.58 21.06 
Estonia 0.57 France 0.10 France 0.48 Germany East 25.60 24.28 
EU-NM  0.55 Hungary 0.10 EU-NM  0.42 Hungary 24.59  
Germany East 0.54 Estonia 0.10 Germany East 0.42 EU-NM  23.96 18.28 
Italy 0.49 Ireland 0.10 Italy 0.40 Slovakia 23.01  
Lithuania 0.48 N. Ireland 0.10 Lithuania 0.39 France 22.79  
Latvia 0.47 Italy 0.09 Latvia 0.38 Portugal 21.67  
Turkey 0.43 Latvia 0.09 Hungary 0.30 Latvia 19.05 23.92 
Hungary 0.40 Lithuania 0.09 Spain 0.29 Slovenia 17.39 15.54 
Poland 0.35 Romania 0.08 Portugal 0.29 Romania 16.07  
Spain 0.35 Poland 0.07 Poland 0.28 Turkey 9.98 5.50 
Portugal 0.34 Spain 0.06 Turkey 0.28 Cyprus   
Greece 0.31 Greece 0.05 Greece 0.26 Greece   
Romania 0.29 Portugal 0.05 Romania 0.21 Luxembourg   
Bulgaria 0.18 Bulgaria 0.05 Bulgaria 0.13 Malta   
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Table 1 (continued)  
Network: Depressed Network: Job Network: Money Altruism: Money Altruism: Time 
Ireland 0.93 Ireland 0.86 Ireland 0.91 N. Ireland 1.29 Romania 0.67 
Netherlands 0.92 Spain 0.80 Spain 0.91 Malta 1.22 Cyprus 0.64 
Spain 0.92 Netherlands 0.79 Sweden 0.90 Ireland 1.17 Luxembourg 0.56 
Sweden 0.91 Luxembourg 0.74 Netherlands 0.88 Netherlands 1.09 Finland 0.55 
Denmark 0.90 Denmark 0.74 Denmark 0.87 Romania 1.08 Netherlands 0.54 
Slovakia 0.90 Austria 0.74 N. Ireland 0.85 Cyprus 0.93 Ireland 0.51 
N. Ireland 0.89 N. Ireland 0.74 Finland 0.84 Luxembourg 0.93 Slovenia 0.50 
Great Britain 0.88 Portugal 0.73 Italy 0.82 Great Britain 0.92 Turkey 0.49 
France 0.87 Great Britain 0.72 Czech Rep. 0.80 Italy 0.92 Austria 0.49 
Czech Rep. 0.86 Slovenia 0.72 EU-OM  0.80 Poland 0.89 Hungary 0.43 
EU-OM  0.86 Italy 0.70 France 0.79 Lithuania 0.89 N. Ireland 0.42 
Luxembourg 0.86 EU-OM  0.70 Slovakia 0.79 Spain 0.87 Poland 0.40 
Italy 0.85 France 0.69 Slovenia 0.79 EU-OM  0.84 EU-OM  0.40 
Finland 0.85 Czech Rep. 0.67 Portugal 0.79 Finland 0.84 EU-NM  0.39 
Austria 0.84 Sweden 0.66 Great Britain 0.79 Turkey 0.82 Italy 0.39 
Malta 0.84 Belgium 0.65 Luxembourg 0.78 Greece 0.82 Greece 0.38 
Portugal 0.84 Hungary 0.63 Estonia 0.77 Austria 0.78 Malta 0.38 
Poland 0.83 Finland 0.61 Poland 0.76 France 0.75 Portugal 0.37 
Belgium 0.81 Germany West 0.61 Austria 0.76 Sweden 0.74 Lithuania 0.35 
Germany West 0.80 Cyprus 0.59 Hungary 0.73 EU-NM  0.73 Latvia 0.34 
Hungary 0.80 Greece 0.56 Greece 0.70 Denmark 0.72 Belgium 0.33 
Slovenia 0.78 Germany East 0.54 EU-NM  0.70 Slovenia 0.70 Spain 0.33 
Germany East 0.78 Poland 0.53 Lithuania 0.68 Portugal 0.66 Great Britain 0.32 
EU-NM  0.78 EU-NM  0.53 Romania 0.68 Belgium 0.65 Germany East 0.32 
Estonia 0.77 Slovakia 0.51 Germany West 0.68 Hungary 0.65 Denmark 0.31 
Lithuania 0.77 Lithuania 0.50 Bulgaria 0.67 Germany East 0.60 Germany West 0.31 
Romania 0.73 Malta 0.50 Belgium 0.66 Latvia 0.59 France 0.30 
Turkey 0.71 Estonia 0.49 Cyprus 0.65 Germany West 0.57 Sweden 0.30 
Latvia 0.71 Turkey 0.48 Germany East 0.62 Slovakia 0.52 Slovakia 0.26 
Bulgaria 0.70 Romania 0.45 Latvia 0.60 Czech Rep. 0.45 Estonia 0.22 
Cyprus 0.70 Latvia 0.40 Turkey 0.58 Estonia 0.41 Czech Rep. 0.20 
Greece 0.69 Bulgaria 0.37 Malta 0.56 Bulgaria 0.32 Bulgaria 0.16 
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Notes:  
Average participation is the average number of voluntary organizations in which respondents actively participate. Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, 
cultural or artistic organizations, youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian groups are trade unions or 
political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer organizations. The 
maximum possible value is 11 for average participation, 7 for Putnam groups and 4 for Olson groups. Network variables take the value of 1 if the respondents feel she has 
someone (besides the members of her immediate household) to rely on when feeling depressed, in need of a new job for herself or a family member, or to borrow money 
urgently, and 0 otherwise. Altruism variables measure whether the respondent contributed money or gave up some of her time during the preceding 12 months to help poor or 
socially excluded people. It takes values of 0 (never), 1 (less than once a month) and 2 (more than once a month). EU-OM and EU-NM stand for average values for old and 
new member countries of the EU, respectively.  
These variables are based on the following surveys: EB50.1 (1998) for civic participation, EB56.1 (2001) for networks, EB52.1 (1999) for altruism, and CCEB 2002.1 for all 
three types of variables for the new member countries. See the text for further details and the precise wording of the relevant questions. We are grateful to the Gallup 
Organisation Europe for kindly making these data available to us. 
Trust is based on the World Value Surveys rounds of 1990 and 1996-97. The numbers correspond to the fraction of the respondents who declare that most people can be 
trusted. Blank cell indicates that the country did not participate in that survey round and therefore no data are available.  
 34




















Olson Groups 0.937         
Putnam Groups 0.949 0.779        
Network: Depressed 0.594 0.443 0.665       
Network: Job 0.451 0.297 0.543 0.753      
Network: Money 0.529 0.452 0.539 0.792 0.742     
Altruism: Money 0.145 0.039 0.228 0.295 0.373 0.167    
Altruism: Time 0.059 0.047 0.067 -0.108 0.204 -0.022 0.649   
Trust (WVS90) 0.804 0.748 0.767 0.653 0.463 0.671 0.309 0.014  




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  















herman Primary Secondary Terrtiary Student 
Bulgaria 46.9 54.0% 68.4% 2.9 24.8% 3.6% 12.0% 3.1% 21.3% 34.8% 0.4% 27.2% 43.1% 19.9% 9.8% 
Cyprus 44.3 52.6% 71.6% 3.3 35.9% 5.0% 20.2% 18.8% 4.8% 14.0% 1.2% 42.3% 29.0% 14.9% 13.7% 
Czech Rep. 43.3 55.0% 55.7% 2.8 29.4% 7.5% 29.3% 2.2% 4.6% 26.2% 0.8% 12.8% 54.2% 19.5% 13.5% 
Estonia 43.1 53.5% 51.1% 2.7 42.8% 4.1% 16.4% 4.0% 7.9% 23.9% 1.0% 7.1% 44.5% 33.4% 15.0% 
Hungary 46.9 55.6% 54.2% 2.6 29.2% 4.4% 13.6% 4.4% 7.8% 39.7% 0.9% 39.2% 37.1% 14.2% 9.5% 
Latvia 42.5 53.2% 55.8% 3.0 32.8% 4.7% 21.0% 4.4% 12.7% 23.7% 0.7% 7.3% 43.8% 36.1% 12.7% 
Lithuania 42.8 53.0% 61.1% 3.0 32.7% 6.2% 21.1% 4.1% 12.3% 22.6% 1.0% 8.1% 40.6% 39.1% 12.2% 
Malta 45.7 49.6% 62.0% 3.2 23.0% 5.8% 17.4% 33.4% 3.8% 16.6% 0.0% 37.9% 46.0% 7.9% 8.2% 
Poland 42.7 53.1% 55.5% 3.1 27.0% 3.7% 13.3% 7.2% 13.6% 30.5% 4.9% 21.3% 42.9% 21.1% 14.7% 
Romania 44.1 53.9% 67.5% 2.9 27.9% 2.5% 9.3% 14.4% 8.9% 36.1% 0.9% 25.4% 45.1% 21.0% 8.4% 
Slovakia 44.2 54.9% 58.0% 3.0 31.1% 4.7% 20.0% 3.3% 10.3% 30.1% 0.6% 18.8% 57.5% 12.2% 11.5% 
Slovenia 44.1 54.3% 57.5% 3.1 33.7% 4.7% 19.5% 3.0% 7.1% 30.5% 1.5% 21.8% 37.3% 23.1% 17.8% 
Turkey 35.1 49.0% 67.2% 4.4 19.7% 7.9% 5.4% 34.3% 16.9% 9.0% 7.1% 63.0% 18.7% 7.6% 10.8% 
EU-NM  43.5 53.2% 60.4% 3.1 30.0% 5.0% 16.8% 10.5% 10.2% 26.0% 1.6% 25.6% 41.5% 20.8% 12.1% 
Belgium 44.3 50.9% 57.0% 2.6 32.9% 9.1% 15.3% 11.0% 9.4% 22.4% 0.0% 18.0% 44.4% 27.1% 10.5% 
Denmark 45.8 49.2% 65.3% 2.4 38.4% 4.7% 24.1% 1.4% 4.5% 26.0% 1.0% 10.0% 17.4% 61.0% 11.6% 
Germany W 46.4 52.1% 57.0% 2.3 31.2% 5.3% 22.8% 12.2% 4.0% 23.8% 0.7% 28.0% 44.4% 22.7% 4.9% 
Greece 43.2 50.0% 64.6% 3.4 19.0% 18.3% 15.4% 17.8% 4.0% 17.6% 7.8% 41.8% 30.7% 17.5% 9.9% 
Italy 43.8 51.9% 54.3% 3.2 26.4% 12.6% 20.0% 12.3% 5.8% 21.6% 1.3% 36.5% 30.7% 18.8% 14.0% 
Spain 42.5 51.3% 56.5% 3.3 31.0% 9.4% 14.4% 19.3% 6.7% 18.1% 1.1% 43.1% 24.8% 18.2% 13.9% 
France 42.9 49.7% 61.4% 2.8 32.1% 6.3% 24.4% 10.2% 7.0% 19.3% 0.8% 16.7% 45.3% 28.4% 9.6% 
Ireland 42.0 51.5% 56.2% 3.5 31.8% 5.7% 13.4% 27.4% 5.3% 10.4% 6.0% 22.5% 54.0% 11.4% 12.1% 
N. Ireland 42.8 51.2% 53.1% 3.2 39.1% 3.1% 18.3% 16.1% 6.2% 16.1% 0.9% 26.4% 50.9% 12.4% 10.2% 
Luxembourg 41.1 51.3% 65.1% 3.2 32.4% 4.2% 28.3% 15.4% 2.7% 16.2% 0.8% 23.6% 37.5% 24.7% 14.2% 
Netherlands 43.4 55.5% 64.8% 2.7 28.1% 4.0% 24.7% 22.8% 4.6% 15.3% 0.4% 16.9% 43.6% 29.4% 10.1% 
Portugal 45.1 53.6% 63.0% 3.1 34.2% 8.6% 12.3% 12.6% 5.2% 23.9% 3.3% 63.1% 17.3% 10.8% 8.8% 
Great Britain 44.3 53.3% 63.3% 2.8 33.2% 5.7% 15.3% 14.1% 7.5% 23.9% 0.3% 32.8% 50.6% 11.0% 5.6% 
Germany E 47.7 54.5% 62.9% 2.3 32.2% 5.9% 13.1% 2.5% 16.0% 29.9% 0.3% 23.8% 51.5% 20.0% 4.7% 
Finland 41.7 52.7% 52.6% 2.3 38.9% 4.8% 16.1% 3.8% 9.2% 24.9% 2.3% 15.9% 30.3% 35.0% 18.8% 
Sweden 45.0 47.1% 62.5% 2.5 35.8% 6.9% 31.9% 0.6% 3.7% 20.8% 0.3% 17.3% 26.1% 42.7% 13.9% 
Austria 42.2 53.8% 60.4% 2.6 31.2% 6.4% 23.7% 13.0% 3.6% 20.0% 2.2% 26.2% 50.1% 15.8% 7.9% 
EU-OM  43.8 51.8% 60.0% 2.8 32.2% 7.1% 19.6% 12.5% 6.2% 20.6% 1.7% 27.2% 38.2% 23.9% 10.6% 
Notes: Figures based on EB 50.1 (1998) and CCEB 2002.  
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Table 4: Individual determinants of civic participation in new member countries 
 Overall Civic Participation std. error 
Putnam 
Groups std. error 
Olsonian 
Groups std. error 
Female -0.275*** (0.049) -0.258*** (0.052) -0.200*** (0.073)
Married -0.131** (0.059) -0.173*** (0.063) 0.082 (0.091)
Age 0.013 (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) 0.086*** (0.017)
Age squared -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0007*** (0.0002)
Children -0.022 (0.025) -0.022 (0.027) -0.038 (0.039)
HH Size -0.030 (0.024) -0.019 (0.026) -0.060 (0.037)
Secondary 0.297*** (0.081) 0.286*** (0.087) 0.426*** (0.141)
University 0.763*** (0.090) 0.717*** (0.096) 0.873*** (0.149)
Student 1.225*** (0.139) 1.355*** (0.145) 0.668*** (0.245)
Self-employed 0.214* (0.116) 0.404*** (0.121) -0.077 (0.155)
White collar 0.123* (0.075) 0.190** (0.080) 0.050 (0.099)
House person -0.439*** (0.117) -0.146 (0.122) -1.177*** (0.229)
Unemployed  -0.424*** (0.114) -0.296** (0.123) -0.613*** (0.185)
Retiree -0.358*** (0.095) 0.018 (0.100) -1.050*** (0.149)
Farmer/fisherman -0.191 (0.206) 0.023 (0.230) -0.329 (0.311)
UE History: 1 -0.359*** (0.083) -0.303*** (0.088) -0.297** (0.124)
UE History: 2+ -0.258** (0.107) -0.137 (0.111) -0.446*** (0.180)
HH Income 2nd Quartile 0.103 (0.080) 0.077 (0.085) 0.186 (0.131)
HH Income 3rd Quartile 0.313*** (0.082) 0.254*** (0.087) 0.315** (0.132)
HH Income 4th Quartile 0.378*** (0.089) 0.359*** (0.094) 0.263* (0.143)
Small/Medium town -0.093 (0.058) -0.132** (0.061) -0.003 (0.086)
City -0.350*** (0.064) -0.347*** (0.068) -0.258*** (0.098)
Cyprus 1.632*** (0.149) 1.881*** (0.166) 1.104*** (0.212)
Czech Rep. 1.924*** (0.131) 2.141*** (0.150) 1.185*** (0.185)
Estonia 1.124*** (0.130) 1.425*** (0.150) 0.312 (0.196)
Hungary 0.998*** (0.130) 1.168*** (0.150) 0.680*** (0.186)
Latvia 1.044*** (0.127) 1.317*** (0.149) 0.330* (0.196)
Lithuania 1.100*** (0.133) 1.392*** (0.154) 0.128 (0.210)
Malta 1.605*** (0.163) 1.968*** (0.178) 0.874*** (0.244)
Poland 0.522*** (0.123) 0.748*** (0.145) 0.164 (0.185)
Romania 0.425*** (0.134) 0.531*** (0.160) 0.230 (0.198)
Slovakia 2.047*** (0.127) 2.276*** (0.145) 1.296*** (0.182)
Slovenia 1.501*** (0.126) 1.704*** (0.147) 0.800*** (0.186)
Log likelihood -7,596.218 -6,625.982 -3273.130 
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.084 0.082 
Wald χ2 1224.67*** 1,093.05*** 562.47*** 
No. of observations 8,899 8,901 8,899 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Civic participation is 
measured as active participation in voluntary organizations (see the text for precise wording of the question and 
list of organizations). Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, 
youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian 
groups are trade unions or political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the 
protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer organizations.  
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Table 5: Individual determinants of civic participation in old member countries 
 Overall Civic Participation std. error 
Putnam 
Groups std. error 
Olsonian 
Groups std. error 
Female -0.242*** (0.041) -0.215*** (0.042) -0.166*** (0.054)
Married 0.020 (0.050) -0.022 (0.050) 0.228*** (0.070)
Age 0.041*** (0.007) 0.022*** (0.008) 0.081*** (0.012)
Age squared -0.0004*** (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001)
Children -0.031 (0.031) -0.071** (0.032) 0.120*** (0.044)
HH Size 0.027 (0.022) 0.074*** (0.023) -0.159*** (0.035)
Secondary 0.291*** (0.057) 0.261*** (0.059) 0.328*** (0.082)
University 0.837*** (0.064) 0.728*** (0.067) 0.789*** (0.088)
Student 1.015*** (0.098) 1.153*** (0.104) 0.355*** (0.143)
Self-employed -0.140 (0.090) 0.120 (0.089) -0.649*** (0.123)
White collar 0.090 (0.059) 0.116* (0.061) -0.037 (0.074)
House person -0.199*** (0.080) 0.034 (0.081) -0.690*** (0.113)
Unemployed  -0.165* (0.090) -0.020 (0.092) -0.332*** (0.123)
Retiree -0.095 (0.081) 0.164* (0.085) -0.521*** (0.112)
Farmer/fisherman 0.291** (0.150) 0.407*** (0.163) 0.096 (0.217)
HH Income 2nd Quartile 0.249*** (0.060) 0.195*** (0.062) 0.269*** (0.084)
HH Income 3rd Quartile 0.649*** (0.064) 0.551*** (0.065) 0.644*** (0.091)
HH Income 4th Quartile 0.756*** (0.069) 0.636*** (0.071) 0.723*** (0.098)
Denmark 1.716*** (0.110) 0.952*** (0.113) 1.991*** (0.149)
Germany West 0.552*** (0.112) 0.645*** (0.113) 0.109 (0.165)
Greece -0.979*** (0.124) -0.914*** (0.127) -0.933*** (0.208)
Italy -0.415*** (0.129) -0.361*** (0.131) -0.409** (0.206)
Spain -0.697*** (0.134) -0.681*** (0.138) -0.722*** (0.226)
France -0.285*** (0.115) -0.173 (0.118) -0.584*** (0.182)
Ireland 0.520*** (0.131) 0.657*** (0.135) -0.126 (0.207)
N-Ireland 0.501*** (0.177) 0.637*** (0.182) -0.233 (0.273)
Luxembourg 0.747*** (0.152) 0.537*** (0.146) 0.929*** (0.215)
Netherlands 1.753*** (0.112) 1.307*** (0.113) 1.753*** (0.154)
Portugal -0.688*** (0.128) -0.602*** (0.132) -0.950*** (0.221)
Great Britain 0.817*** (0.123) 0.736*** (0.124) 0.665*** (0.170)
Germany East -0.202* (0.113) -0.131 (0.116) -0.457*** (0.177)
Finland 1.143*** (0.108) 0.702*** (0.112) 1.455*** (0.149)
Sweden 2.073*** (0.143) 0.984*** (0.150) 2.620*** (0.184)
Austria 0.478*** (0.119) 0.408*** (0.119) 0.513*** (0.168)
Log likelihood -1,1367.22 -10,210.34 -5,870.042 
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.081 0.198 
Wald χ2 2,923.19*** 1,568.99*** 2,273.74 
No. of observations 10,699 10,699 10,699 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Civic participation is 
measured as active participation in voluntary organizations (see the text for precise wording of the question and 
list of organizations). Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, 
youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian 
groups are trade unions or political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the 
protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer organizations.  
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Table 6: Individual determinants of social networks in new member countries 
 Networks if depressed std. error 
Networks if 
needs job std. error 
Networks to 
borrow std. error 
Female 0.343*** (0.057) -0.119** (0.050) 0.081 (0.053)
Married 0.096 (0.070) 0.062 (0.062) 0.127* (0.066)
Age -0.059*** (0.011) -0.065*** (0.010) -0.071*** (0.010)
Age squared 0.0004*** -0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0006*** -0.0001
Children 0.042 (0.027) 0.026 (0.025) 0.086*** (0.026)
HH Size -0.156*** (0.027) -0.148*** (0.024) -0.181*** (0.025)
Secondary 0.091*** (0.079) 0.122* (0.075) 0.298*** (0.074)
University 0.275** (0.092) 0.349*** (0.086) 0.459*** (0.087)
Student 0.385** (0.172) 0.258* (0.146) 0.235 (0.157)
Self-employed 0.344 (0.159) 0.486*** (0.130) 0.636*** (0.161)
White collar 0.098 (0.094) 0.217*** (0.078) 0.147* (0.088)
House person -0.084 (0.120) -0.203* (0.109) 0.011 (0.114)
Unemployed  -0.083 (0.113) -0.255*** (0.104) -0.084 (0.106)
Retiree 0.044 (0.106) -0.052 (0.095) -0.093 (0.100)
Farmer/fisherman -0.234 (0.224) 0.193 (0.197) -0.089 (0.213)
UE History: 1 -0.169** (0.088) -0.320*** (0.077) -0.215*** (0.084)
UE History: 2+ -0.329*** (0.117) -0.296*** (0.104) -0.438*** (0.108)
HH Income 2nd Quartile 0.244*** (0.082) 0.278*** (0.079) 0.240*** (0.078)
HH Income 3rd Quartile 0.362*** (0.087) 0.399*** (0.081) 0.420*** (0.082)
HH Income 4th Quartile 0.621*** (0.098) 0.866*** (0.089) 0.749*** (0.094)
Small/Medium town -0.064 (0.067) -0.122** (0.060) -0.141** (0.063)
City -0.046 (0.073) -0.055 (0.066) -0.239*** (0.069)
Cyprus -0.213 (0.138) 0.814*** (0.136) -0.312** (0.136)
Czech Rep. 0.815*** (0.147) 1.025*** (0.129) 0.339*** (0.137)
Estonia 0.030 (0.123) 0.154 (0.115) 0.162 (0.122)
Hungary 0.392*** (0.121) 1.072*** (0.112) 0.145 (0.116)
Latvia -0.191 (0.119) -0.113 (0.115) -0.536*** (0.114)
Lithuania -0.003 (0.131) 0.251** (0.123) -0.361*** (0.125)
Malta 0.750*** (0.173) 0.370** (0.154) -0.609*** (0.151)
Poland 0.629*** (0.112) 0.452*** (0.100) 0.285*** (0.105)
Romania -0.087 (0.115) 0.233** (0.113) -0.189* (0.112)
Slovakia 1.209*** (0.154) 0.528*** (0.118) 0.447*** (0.128)
Slovenia 0.150 (0.128) 1.258*** (0.121) 0.221* (0.126)
Constant 2.470*** (0.299) 1.386*** (0.267) 2.648*** (0.285)
Log likelihood -4,259.41 -4,938.50 -4,646.19 
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.092 0.057 
Wald χ2 458.86*** 859.85*** 522.32*** 
No. of observations 8,625 7,852 8,303 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.  Networks variables take 
value 1 if the respondent can rely on other people outside their immediate household if she feels depressed, 
needs a job for herself or a family member, or needs to borrow money to pay an urgent bill.  
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Table 7: Individual determinants of social networks in old member countries 
 Networks if depressed std. error 
Networks if 
needs job std. error 
Networks to 
borrow std. error 
Female 0.557*** (0.062) -0.043 (0.049) 0.191*** (0.056)
Married -0.052 (0.068) 0.046 (0.055) -0.003 (0.062)
Age -0.027*** (0.011) -0.039*** (0.009) -0.025*** (0.010)
Age squared 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Secondary 0.213*** (0.076) 0.172*** (0.063) 0.093 (0.070)
University 0.396*** (0.095) 0.293*** (0.073) 0.205*** (0.084)
Student 0.713*** (0.181) 0.378*** (0.131) 0.538*** (0.157)
Self-employed 0.257* (0.146) 0.105 (0.114) 0.367*** (0.135)
White collar 0.303*** (0.100) 0.124* (0.075) 0.268*** (0.088)
House person 0.065 (0.124) -0.082 (0.092) 0.126 (0.107)
Unemployed  -0.272** (0.117) -0.732*** (0.094) -0.315*** (0.104)
Retiree 0.023 (0.115) -0.115 (0.090) -0.040 (0.105)
Farmer/fisherman 0.459* (0.278) -0.021 (0.215) -0.003 (0.239)
HH Income 2nd Quartile 0.304*** (0.081) 0.301*** (0.066) 0.225*** (0.073)
HH Income 3rd Quartile 0.391*** (0.090) 0.477*** (0.073) 0.529*** (0.084)
HH Income 4th Quartile 0.548*** (0.104) 0.615*** (0.080) 0.652*** (0.093)
Small/Medium town -0.063 (0.070) -0.140*** (0.057) -0.081 (0.064)
City 0.011 (0.077) -0.021 (0.062) 0.015 (0.070)
Denmark 0.695*** (0.162) 0.217* (0.130) 1.314*** (0.144)
Germany West 0.084 (0.144) -0.212* (0.126) 0.264** (0.126)
Greece -0.494*** (0.141) -0.376*** (0.129) 0.345*** (0.130)
Italy 0.293* (0.162) 0.256* (0.144) 0.957*** (0.152)
Spain 1.142*** (0.185) 0.665*** (0.144) 1.807*** (0.172)
France 0.606*** (0.160) 0.165 (0.131) 0.857*** (0.136)
Ireland 1.489*** (0.286) 0.806*** (0.187) 1.573*** (0.219)
N-Ireland 0.978*** (0.285) 0.310 (0.204) 1.344*** (0.243)
Luxembourg 0.447*** (0.182) 0.348** (0.155) 0.680*** (0.157)
Netherlands 1.228*** (0.200) 0.510*** (0.145) 1.628*** (0.175)
Portugal 0.316** (0.157) 0.473*** (0.140) 0.874*** (0.143)
Great Britain 0.722*** (0.177) 0.326** (0.143) 0.959*** (0.150)
Germany East -0.024 (0.140) -0.394*** (0.124) 0.068 (0.124)
Finland 0.232 (0.150) -0.317*** (0.127) 1.156*** (0.140)
Sweden 1.079*** (0.167) 0.020 (0.125) 1.908*** (0.156)
Austria 0.062 (0.155) 0.299** (0.141) 0.486*** (0.140)
Constant 1.501*** (0.281) 1.526*** (0.231) 0.801*** (0.253)
Log likelihood -4,001.45 -5,622.07 -4,612.88 
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.074 0.091 
Wald χ2 626.11*** 788.80*** 808.76*** 
No. of observations 10,376 9,650 9,952 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Networks variables take 
value 1 if the respondent can rely on other people outside their immediate household if she feels depressed, 















needs job std. error
Networks 
to borrow std. error
Female -0.240*** (0.030) -0.202*** (0.035) -0.145*** (0.041) 0.421*** (0.040) -0.077*** (0.033) 0.167*** (0.037)
Married 0.071** (0.036) 0.111*** (0.042) 0.336*** (0.052) -0.055 (0.046) -0.008 (0.038) 0.016 (0.042)
Age 0.034*** (0.006) 0.031*** (0.007) 0.091*** (0.010) -0.033*** (0.007) -0.043*** (0.006) -0.038*** (0.007)
Age squared -0.0003*** (0.0001) -0.0003*** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
Children 0.040*** (0.016) 0.036** (0.019) 0.146*** (0.023)
HH Size -0.063*** (0.014) -0.077*** (0.016) -0.168*** (0.020)
Secondary 0.522*** (0.043) 0.489*** (0.055) 0.635*** (0.067) 0.238*** (0.051) 0.082* (0.045) 0.189*** (0.047)
University 1.103*** (0.047) 1.063*** (0.058) 1.320*** (0.069) 0.383*** (0.059) 0.241*** (0.051) 0.401*** (0.055)
Student 1.454*** (0.074) 1.266*** (0.090) 1.094*** (0.115) 0.626*** (0.116) 0.326*** (0.092) 0.488*** (0.102)
Self-employed -0.200*** (0.069) -0.243*** (0.078) -0.618*** (0.091) 0.287*** (0.104) 0.295*** (0.084) 0.501*** (0.102)
White collar 0.120*** (0.045) 0.091* (0.051) -0.026 (0.056) 0.250*** (0.066) 0.239*** (0.052) 0.226*** (0.060)
House person -0.338*** (0.060) -0.474*** (0.076) -0.973*** (0.094) 0.079 (0.080) -0.068 (0.064) 0.011 (0.072)
Unemployed  -0.531*** (0.064) -0.580*** (0.078) -0.673*** (0.092) -0.311*** (0.073) -0.663*** (0.063) -0.343*** (0.067)
Retiree -0.350** (0.058) -0.387*** (0.070) -0.769*** (0.086) 0.023 (0.074) -0.079 (0.063) -0.056 (0.068)
Farmer/fisherman -0.227*** (0.108) -0.266* (0.140) -0.408*** (0.159) 0.024 (0.165) 0.038 (0.142) 0.001 (0.150)
HH Income 2nd Quartile 0.162*** (0.045) 0.158*** (0.055) 0.181*** (0.066) 0.227*** (0.055) 0.253*** (0.048) 0.228*** (0.050)
HH Income 3rd Quartile 0.314*** (0.046) 0.268*** (0.056) 0.287*** (0.067) 0.284*** (0.058) 0.370*** (0.050) 0.388*** (0.054)
HH Income 4th Quartile 0.419*** (0.050) 0.364*** (0.059) 0.320*** (0.071) 0.504*** (0.065) 0.709*** (0.054) 0.606*** (0.060)
Small/Medium town  0.000 (0.046) -0.133*** (0.039) -0.091** (0.043)
City  -0.063 (0.050) -0.099** (0.042) -0.167*** (0.046)
New members  -0.949*** (0.035) 0.258*** (0.039) -1.144*** (0.051) -0.509*** (0.039) -0.735*** (0.033) -0.440*** (0.036)
Constant  2.054*** (0.179) 1.755*** (0.151) 1.845*** (0.164)
Log likelihood -20,527.24 -14,013.01 -10,079.12 -8,734.46 -11,075.22 -9,840.80
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.045 0.093 0.042 0.074 0.042
Wald χ2 2,435.37*** 1,274.67*** 1,716.89*** 738.56*** 1,543.71*** 790.64***
No. of observations 19,854 19,661 19,702 19,293 17,774 18531
Notes: Estimated with logit or ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.. 
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Table 9: Individual and aggregate determinants of social capital: Pooled data  
 
Overall Civic 








needs job std. error
Networks to 
borrow std. error 
Female -0.258*** (0.055) -0.220*** (0.065) -0.195*** (0.068) 0.429*** (0.060) -0.111*** (0.036) 0.124** (0.050)
Married -0.023 (0.056) 0.011 (0.071) 0.200*** (0.066) -0.021 (0.056) -0.015 (0.037) 0.039 (0.057)
Age 0.032*** (0.007) 0.028** (0.012) 0.087*** (0.009) -0.034*** (0.008) -0.045*** (0.006) -0.039*** (0.007)
Age squared -0.0003*** (0.0001) -0.0003** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
Children -0.030 (0.027) -0.036 (0.033) 0.060 (0.039)  
HH Size 0.036 (0.023) 0.014 (0.026) -0.073** (0.029)  
Secondary 0.333*** (0.086) 0.353*** (0.112) 0.419*** (0.096) 0.193*** (0.071) 0.042 (0.063) 0.142* (0.082)
University 0.837*** (0.090) 0.823*** (0.128) 0.908*** (0.091) 0.309*** (0.082) 0.193*** (0.067) 0.300*** (0.087)
Student 1.153*** (0.118) 0.933*** (0.225) 0.581*** (0.195) 0.520*** (0.132) 0.265* (0.137) 0.393*** (0.144)
Self-employed 0.039 (0.095) -0.064 (0.150) -0.363*** (0.136) 0.341*** (0.114) 0.299*** (0.090) 0.524*** (0.107)
White collar 0.169** (0.068) 0.129 (0.079) 0.064 (0.073) 0.274*** (0.070) 0.248*** (0.065) 0.268*** (0.064)
House person -0.211 (0.153) -0.394* (0.201) -0.664*** (0.247) 0.110 (0.135) 0.038 (0.095) 0.193** (0.091)
Unemployed  -0.430*** (0.079) -0.462*** (0.095) -0.563*** (0.130) -0.281*** (0.101) -0.623*** (0.081) -0.348*** (0.082)
Retiree -0.203** (0.089) -0.244* (0.142) -0.676*** (0.170) 0.060 (0.078) -0.024 (0.075) -0.011 (0.077)
Farmer/fisherman 0.159 (0.248) 0.058 (0.261) -0.070 (0.325) 0.039 (0.183) 0.108 (0.144) -0.006 (0.157)
HH Income 2nd Quartile 0.146* (0.072) 0.128 (0.091) 0.167** (0.082) 0.182*** (0.064) 0.217*** (0.072) 0.162** (0.067)
HH Income 3rd Quartile 0.478*** (0.095) 0.426*** (0.132) 0.486*** (0.127) 0.253*** (0.082) 0.358*** (0.071) 0.340*** (0.087)
HH Income 4th Quartile 0.513*** (0.114) 0.453*** (0.151) 0.466*** (0.170) 0.446*** (0.105) 0.709*** (0.088) 0.574*** (0.107)
Small/Medium town  -0.025 (0.058) -0.129** (0.057) -0.081 (0.062)
City  -0.028 (0.065) -0.057 (0.086) -0.102 (0.074)
GDP per capita 
(thousands) 0.023 (0.024) 0.019 (0.027) 0.007 (0.022) -0.001 (0.017) 0.000 (0.018) -0.029** (0.013)
Gini coefficient  -0.049* (0.027) -0.071** (0.034) -0.064** (0.031) -0.008 (0.022) -0.022 (0.017) -0.004 (0.020)
Non-corruption 0.249*** (0.092) 0.337*** (0.099) 0.461*** (0.108) 0.156 (0.102) 0.022 (0.104) 0.292*** (0.085)
Economic Freedom  0.422** (0.176) 0.345* (0.195) 0.116 (0.250) -0.027 (0.155) 0.161 (0.168) -0.170 (0.139)
New members 0.942*** (0.323) 2.436*** (0.409) 0.943** (0.404) -0.042 (0.300) -0.414 (0.311) -0.220 (0.244)
Constant   1.446 (1.173) 1.131 (0.951) 1.864* (0.957)
F-statistics 12.88*** 19.01*** 36.11*** 21.91*** 71.25*** 14.76***
No. of observations 19,019 18,841 18,882 18,460 17,010 17,758
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Notes: Estimated with logit or ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.. Standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that country-level and 
individual variables are observed at different levels of aggregation. GDP per capita is in thousands of US dollars adjusted for purchasing-power parity. Non-corruption is the 
corruption perception index as compiled by Transparency International, higher values indicate less corruption. Economic freedom is the index compiled by the Frasier 
Institute.  
 
